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Abstract
This paper studies the difference in task supplies and economic status between natives
and two generations of immigrants. I estimate differences in task supply and earnings
between natives and immigrants in 1970 and 2015, which are the beginning and end of
the fifth (and current) wave of immigration to Canada. Furthermore, using a three-fold
Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition, I link the average weekly wage of workers to their task
productivity, and try to find the effects of the returns to tasks as well as different task
supplies on the average wage gap between natives and immigrants. Finally, I use ordered
probit and logit models to demonstrate and measure the significant effects of immigrant
status on an employee’s labor market segment.
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1 Introduction
According to Statistics Canada, Canada is currently experiencing its “fifth wave” of immigrants,
which began in the 1970s. In this wave, immigrants have overwhelmingly been members of
visible minorities from the developing world. This was influenced by the 1976 revision of the
Immigration Act, which continues to be official government policy. Historically, the majority
of immigrants coming to Canada were from Europe. As time passed, the number of new
European immigrants entering the country steadily declined, while the number of immigrants
originating from South and South-East Asia (India, China, the Philippines, and so on) rose
dramatically. By the 1980s, these Asians became the largest ethnic group immigrating to
Canada. Canadians do not have the stereotypical American “melting pot” and instead enjoy
ethnic diversity. Canada is a multicultural society that depends on immigration as its key
source of labor force growth (Bloom et al 1995, Baker and Benjamin 1994). There has been
a lot of research on immigrants’ performance in the North American labor market. Research
on this topic has evolved from the original cross-sectional evidence on immigrants’ economic
assimilation (Chiswick 1978) through the study of the qualities of different immigration co-
horts (Borjas 1985) to controversies over measurement issues (Lalonde and Topel 1992) and
subsequent studies (Borjas 1993). Peri and Sparber (2009) define two intermediate tasks (com-
munication and manual tasks) supplied in each occupation using O*NET data to study the
effect of the immigrant share on native workers’ provision of these two tasks in the US labor
market. Following this research, I study the economic outcomes of different generations of
immigrants to see if I can find any differences between the first generation immigrants and
their children in the Canadian labor market. The outcomes I will focus on are earnings and
task usage.
Chiswick (2003) argues that there is evidence of positive selection bias in migration in the
US, that is, individuals who are relatively more skilled than their peers in their home country
are more likely to migrate to the US. If this positive selection bias is present among immigrants
in the US, then one could argue that selection bias should play an even greater role in Canada.
US immigration policy emphasizes family unification to a greater extent than Canadian im-
migration policy. Canada’s “point system” does take family ties into account, but substantial
consideration is given to the amount of human capital attained by applicants (Baker and Ben-
jamin, 1994). The goal of this stringent evaluation process is to simultaneously minimize racial
discrimination when determining the eligibility of foreigners and to ensure that those who are
entering into Canada can make a positive contribution to the economy. Therefore it may be
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that second generation immigrants in Canada have higher levels of ability and motivation rel-
ative to third generation (and higher) immigrants if these traits are transmitted from parents
to children. Black et al (2005) also suggested that “unobserved parental characteristics”, such
as patience or attitudes, could influence the development of children. Moreover, Warman et
al (2019) claims that, although recent immigrants to Canada have had some difficulty fully
realizing their potential suggested by their high levels of pre-immigration human capital, their
children have integrated well and in many cases have surpassed the outcomes of the third or
higher generation.
In this paper, I study differences in the economic performance of natives, and first gen-
eration immigrants, and second generation immigrants in 1970 and 2015. I choose the years
1970 and 2015 because they are the beginning of the fifth wave of immigration and the most
recent census year in Canada, respectively. In addition to earnings, I compare the task supply
performance of natives (third generation or more) and first and second generation immigrants
in 1970 and 2015. Then, I link earnings and task supply performance together using a Oaxaca
Decomposition. This sheds light on the relative importance of differences in task productivity
and differences in the return to task productivity in determining weekly wage differences be-
tween natives and two generations of immigrants. Lastly, I investigate differences in the labor
market segment that first and second generation immigrants work in. By presenting average
marginal effects from ordered probit and logit models, I present the relative probabilities of
working in each segment for first generation or second generation immigrants, compared to
the third generation or higher (natives).
2 Literature Review
There is a large literature on differences in the outcomes of first generation immigrants, second
generation immigrants, and natives. According to Lay and Nguyen (1998), in addition to the
general daily hassles encountered by most people, immigrants often face chronic difficulties
specific to the acculturation experience, including conflicts with family members, members of
the ethnic ingroup, and members of ethnic outgroups. Moreover, it has been suggested that the
children of immigrants born in Canada (i.e., second-generation immigrants) may experience
different acculturative stressors from their parents (i.e., first-generation immigrants). In the
discussion of minority student stressors, Saldaña (1994) includes issues such as the perceived
lack of support from members of the ethnic ingroup, difficulties in romantic relationships with
members of the ingroup (particularly the availability of dating partners), and being perceived
3
by the ethnic ingroup as behaving too much like outgroup members. Pawliuk, Grizenko, Chan-
Yip, Gantous, Mathew, and Nguyen (1996) found that, although children’s acculturation style
was not related to their psychological functioning, the parents’ acculturation style was an im-
portant predictor of their children’s functioning.They argued that, because children were more
acculturated into the mainstream society than their parents were, the more accepting parents
were of the majority culture, the healthier was the psychological functioning in children. In
their study of Chinese-Canadian youths, Lay and Verkuyten (1999) found that the life expe-
rience of these adolescents, particularly whether they are Canadian-born or foreign-born, has
implications for ethnic identity and self-esteem.
In the US, it is widely believed that the socioeconomic performance of the children of
immigrants far surpasses that of their parents. Chiswick (1977) and Carliner (1980) compared
the earnings of various generations of workers in the US at a particular point in time, the
1970 decennial census. Borjas (2014) studied wage differentials across generations, and he
found that the relative wages of immigrants have declined steadily since 1940, and second
generation Americans earn more than both their parents and their children. However, when
he controlled for education in the regression models, the difference between first Americans
and their children’s weekly earnings became much smaller. Borjas (2014) claimed much of the
intergenerational progress observed between first and second generations can be explained by
differences in educational attainment between these two groups, as the native-born children
of immigrants go through the American education system.
Using data from the 1991 Canadian census, Pendakur and Pendakur (1998) concluded
that both foreign-born (first generation) and Canadian-born (second generation and higher)
visible minorities earned less than Canadian-born Caucasians. They suggested that this wage
discrepancy is due to racial discrimination since it cannot be fully explained by observable
characteristics. However, Hum and Simpson (1999) discovered no evidence of a wage gap
between visible minority and non-visible minority groups. Bloom et al (1995) established
that, using pooled 1971, 1981, and 1986 Canadian census data, assimilation was particularly
slow for immigrant men from Asia, Africa, and Latin America relative to immigrant men from
Europe and the United States.
Aydemir and Sweetman (2007) find that, the second generation in both the US and Canada
has very good educational and labor market outcomes, which is similar to, and in some cases
better than, the third generation, and clearly much better than the first generation. Mean-
while, they conclude that, in the US, current immigrant characteristics, holding the structure
of educational attainment and earnings constant, are associated with lower outcomes in the
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future than is the case for the current second generation, whereas in Canada the reverse can
be expected. Warman et al (2019) indicate that the criteria employed in Skilled Worker, CEC,
and PNP admission categories lead to the selection of immigrants likely to succeed in the Cana-
dian labour market in more nuanced ways than merely choosing those with high education and
good language skills in English or French. Their analysis suggests that selecting immigrants
based on economic criteria in general and a points system (as in the Skilled Worker category)
in particular both improves the outcomes of the Principal Applicant and also leads to higher
earnings outcomes for the Child Arrival immigrants once they enter the labour market.
3 Data and Variables
3.1 Data Source
I use two of data sets in this paper. The first is Canadian census data published in the
years 1971 and 2016, which refer to the data in the years 1970 and 2016. This data set
is collected by Statistics Canada, and contains respondents’ characteristics, including age,
education attainment, ethnic information, immigration status, occupation, income, and so on.
The second data set is the Canadian Career Handbook (CHA), which I will describe in more
detail in Section 3.3.
3.1.1 Data Selection
The cleaned data set I use in this paper will only contain individuals who are between the ages
of 18-65 and have identified themselves as working mainly full time in the years 1970 and 2015.
In addition, I will exclude self-employee workers and those working on farms because I believe
these workers’ incomes will cause biases in the study since their incomes might not be a base
on task supplies and educational attainments. Institution residents and part-time workers are
also excluded from this study. Using the CHA data, I am able to classify occupations into
labor market segments. Jobs in the Canadian labor market are classified into three segments,
the primary upper tier, the primary lower tier, and the secondary segment. The key feature I
use to assign occupations to segments is the degree of autonomy and skill professional required
by them.
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3.2 Independent Variables Description
In my empirical models, I have some key independent variables. I define first generation
immigrants as those who were born outside Canada. For second generation immigrants, there
are two different definitions. The first one is those born inside Canada with parents both born
outside. The second one defines second generation immigrants as those born inside Canada
with at least one parent born outside Canada. In this paper, I will use the second definition
because I believe that even one foreign-born parent can influence their children with outside
culture, ideas, education concepts, and so on. These will make second generation immigrants
different from third generation immigrants and higher. Another key independent variable is a
worker’s language skill. In this paper, I define a worker as not a native speaker (nolang) if his
or her most often used language at home is neither English nor French. Moreover, there would
be an alternative way to approach the language proficiency variable as using place-specific
language indicators (e.g. French for Quebec, both for NB, English for other provinces.), which
I will explore in future work. This “nolang” is a dummy variable (nolang=1 means this worker
does not speak English or French as a first language.). I believe a person who is capable of
speaking the Canadian official languages at home could use them very well at work. Moreover,
I have some other control variables in the empirical models including years of schooling, marital
status, industry dummies, and metropolitan area dummies (CMAs).
3.3 Task Variables Generation
To assign task supplies to occupations, I will use a data set, the Canadian Career Hand-
book (CHA), which is also from Statistics Canada. This data set gives values indicating the
aptitudes requirement in each occupation. Aptitudes in each occupation are categorized as:
General Learning, Verbal, Numerical, Spatial Perception, Form Perception, Clerical Percep-
tion, Motor Coordination, Finger Dexterity, and Manual Dexterity. Each aptitude is given
one of five values (1-5) to describe its grade among all working population1. I generate a new
variable to describe the importance of each aptitude. I will use the median of each aptitude’s
ranking range among the entire working population to represent that aptitude’s importance.
For example, the median of the highest 10 percent is 0.95. Then, I will replace the value 1 by
0.95. Using this method, I will assign 0.75 for the value 2, 0.50 for 3, 0.25 for 4, and 0.05 for
1The value 1 means the aptitude for this occupation is the highest 10 percent among all the working
population. The value 2 means the upper third, exclusive of the highest 10 percent. The value 3 means the




Next, I can use the aptitude importance variable to define task requirements for each
occupation. The task requirement can also be considered the task supply per unit of time
or task productivity of employees with this occupation.2 Similar to what Imai, Stacey and
Warman (2019) and Warman and Worswick (2015) did in their papers, I will define three
types of tasks: analytical (A), interactive (I), and manual (M). Analytical tasks are defined
as a combination of General learning ability (G), numerical ability (N), spatial perception
(S), and form perception (P), while interactive tasks are defined by the combination of Verbal
ability (V) and clerical perception (Q). Finally, I combine the aptitude importance values of
Motor coordination (K), finger dexterity (F), and manual dexterity (M) to define manual task.
The method of the combination is to take the mean of these importance values for each type
of task.
4 Empirical Framework
To do the empirical work, I estimate the following regression equation:
Y = βX + αF + γS + δC + ε (1)
Y: The outcome variables (Natural logarithm of weekly wages or task supplies by workers).
X: Vector of standard demographic variables (age, age^2, age^3, schooling years/education
attainment, language ability, industry, genders, marital status)
F: A dummy variable for first generation immigrants. (1: the first generation. 0: others)
S: A dummy variable for second generation immigrants. (1: the second generation. 0:
others)
C: Census Metropolitan Areas (CMA).
To predict the segments first and second generation immigrants will be in, compared to the
third generation and higher, I will assume the exact but unobservable human capital based on
demographic characteristics for worker i is E∗i i.e. E
∗ = βX + αF + γS + δC + ε or simply,
2Since only full-time workers are included in this study, task supply per unit of time (task productivity)
here could be treated as well as the aggregated task supply by a worker.
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1 if E∗i ≤θ1
2 if θ1 < E
∗
i ≤θ2
3 if E∗i > θ2
(2)
Here, “seg” represents job segments. “seg=1” represents the secondary segment while “2”
means primary segment, lower tier, and “3” means primary segment, upper tier. “Z” is the
combination matrix of all the independent variables on the RHS.
5 Empirical Results
5.1 Earnings
In this part, I estimate the following equation:
lnw = βX + αF + γS + δC + ε (3)
Where “lnw” represents the natural logarithm of the employee’s weekly wage.
The regression estimates presented in Table 1 briefly outline any noticeable differences
in weekly wages between the three immigrant generations when controlling for language skill
and education in two census years. The base group in each regression consists of third and
higher generation immigrants. In this table, there are two columns of results for each year.
One controls for observations’ educational attainment, while the other does not. In 1970,
immigrants in Canada were still overwhelmingly from European, as this year is considered
the start of the fifth wave of immigration in Canada. At first glance, it appears that the two
columns for this year give us two different results. When education is not controlled for, first
generation immigrants look not very different from third and higher generation immigrants,
in terms of weekly earnings. The second generation has 3% higher weekly wages than third
generation immigrants. Limited proficiency in an official language also leads to a significant
reduction in the weekly wage. However, after I control for years of schooling, things turn out
to be different. First generation immigrants tend to have a weekly wage 2.2% lower than the
third generation. The second generation does not have a very different weekly wage from third
generation immigrants (only 1.1% higher) when education is controlled for. The effect of the
weakness of language skill on earnings is also weakened when I control for education. The
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coefficients on the gender and marital status variables are not affected very much by adding
years of schooling to the regression. Female workers tend to earn a lower weekly wage while
married workers tend to earn more.
The results suggest that, in 1970, the higher weekly wages of first and second generation
immigrants is driven by their higher educational attainment, compared to third generation
immigrants. After I control for years of education, first generation immigrants tend to earn
a lower weekly wage than third generation immigrants, while second generation immigrants
have a similar weekly wage as third generation immigrants. In addition, the lack of official
language ability might also result from lower education attainment.
The third and fourth columns in the table present the results for the year 2015. In this
year, Canada had been experiencing the fifth immigration wave for more than four decades.
More and more immigrants from South Asia, China and the Caribbean were coming to Canada
during those years. Because of the points-based immigration system, most immigrants have
high educational attainment and a “not bad” Canadian official language ability. Therefore, in
the year 2015, things look different from the year 1971. Without controlling for education,
first generation immigrants appear to have 6.3% lower weekly wages and second generation
immigrants have 2.7% higher wages, compared to third generation immigrants. Controlling
for education, the wage gap between first generation immigrants and third generation immi-
grants widens to 11.5%. However, the wage gap between second generation immigrants and
third generation narrows. The weekly wage of second generation immigrants is merely 0.9
percent higher than that of the third generation, controlling for educational attainment. The
coefficients on the other three control variables are not affected by controlling for education
quite as much.
In 2015, the majority of immigrants in the Canadian labor market were from China, India,
South Asia, and other developing countries. First and second generation immigrants appear
to benefit from higher educational attainment, compared to the third generation. Controlling
for education in the regression, first generation immigrants have an even bigger wage gap
relative to the third generation. Meanwhile, second immigrants have earnings quite close to
third generation immigrants when they have the same educational attainment. This might be
evidence for the assumption that, second generation immigrants are more educated on average
than natives (third and higher generation immigrants) in the Canadian labor market in recent
years, which is claimed in many places.
These regression results lead to several conclusions about the economic performance of first
and second generation immigrants in the Canadian labor market. First, since many recent
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immigrants to Canada are from South Asia, China, Caribbean, and similar countries, the
difference between the weekly earnings of the first generation and natives appears to be much
wider in 2015 than in 1970. However, wage differences between second generation immigrants
and natives are quite similar in these two census years, whether or not I control for education.
In both years, second generation immigrants appear to obtain a higher wage through higher
education attainment. When I control for education in the regressions, the difference between
the second and third generations becomes very tiny but still positive. In 2015, official language
ability plays a more important role in earnings. Finally, the gender pay gap is much smaller
in 2015 than 1970, which might suggest a lessening of gender discrimination in the Canadian
labor market.
5.2 Task Supplies
To study differences in task supplies of first and second generation immigrants, I will estimate
the following empirical model:
T = βX + αF + γS + δC + ε (4)
Here, T represents the task supplies which is A (analytical), I (interactive), and M (manual).
Table 2 presents results from twelve regressions. These results display differences in the
three task supplies (analytical, interactive and manual) between three generations of immi-
grants in two census years. The differences between the two columns of results for each task
supply in each census year is whether industry fixed effects are included in the regression.
Each regression includes a control for education. In 1970, the results do not change much with
the inclusion of industry fixed effects. In 1970, both first and second generation immigrants
supply significantly more analytical tasks than third generation immigrants, although the dif-
ference is small. The difference between second and third generation immigrants (0.3%) is not
as big as that between the first and third generations (around 0.7%). However, when looking
at the supplies of interactive and manual tasks, first and second generation immigrants give
the opposite result. Compared to third and higher generation immigrants, first generation
immigrants supply fewer interactive tasks but more manual tasks, while second generation
immigrants tend to supply more interactive tasks but somewhat fewer manual tasks.
As in 1970, industry dummies do not play an important role in the regressions for the
year 2015. Different from 1970, first generation immigrants appear to supply fewer analytical
and interactive tasks but more manual tasks than the third generation. Conversely, second
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generation immigrants supply more analytical and interactive tasks but fewer manual tasks
than the third generation with the baseline being the third generation or more.
Based on the results in this section, if we link wage differences between natives and im-
migrants to task supply differences, we can draw some interesting conclusions. The wage
gap between first generation immigrants and natives is smaller in 1970 than that in 2015.
In fact, in 1970, first generations earned more than natives before controlling for education.
This may be the result of different immigration source countries and different task supplies
from first generation immigrants in these two years. In addition, first generation immigrants
and natives could receive different returns to their task supplies when working, which might
lead to a lessening of the earnings gap as well. Task supply performance is similar between
second generation immigrants in 1970 and 2015, which might partly explain the similarity in
the earnings of the second generation and natives in these two years.
5.3 Blinder-Oaxaca Decomposition
In this section, I explore the effect of task supplies on the average earnings gap between the
two generations of immigrants and natives. I will apply a decomposition method to do this.
Many previous studies use a similar methodology to study systematic differences in labor
market outcomes by group (sex, race, and so on). The procedure is known in the literature
as the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder (1973); Oaxaca (1973)). It divides the wage
differential between two groups into a part that is “explained” by group differences in produc-
tivity characteristics, such as education or work experience, and a residual part that cannot be
explained by such differences. This “unexplained” part is often used as a measure for discrimi-
nation, but it also subsumes the effects of group differences in unobserved characteristics. Most
applications of the technique can be found in the labor market and discrimination literature
(for meta studies, see, e.g., Stanley and Jarrell (1998) or Weichselbaumer and Winter-Ebmer
(2005)). However, the method can also be useful in my study. I will apply a threefold decom-
position method, which I will describe in detail below.
5.3.1 Methods and Formulas
Given two groups, 1 and 2; outcomes of these two groups, Y1 and Y2; and a combination of
predictors. In my study, these two groups are either first generation immigrants and natives or
second generation immigrants and natives. Outcomes are (log) weekly wages of natives, first
generation immigrants, and second generation immigrants, and are denoted wn, wf , and ws,
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respectively. Task productivity variables and demographic characteristics such as age, female,
education and so on are predictors.
Now, I can derive the the mean outcome difference as
R = E(Y1)− E(Y2)
= E(wi)− E(wn)
Where i∈(f,s), n=natives, f=the first generation immigrants, s=the second generation immi-




iβi + εi (5)
Where i=n,f,s; X is a matrix of independent variables including task variables and the inde-
pendent variables in Equation (4). I can derive the native-first generation immigrant wage
gap (see Winsborough and Dickinson (1971); Jones and Kelley (1984); and Daymont and
Andrisani (1984)) which is














This is a “threefold” decomposition; that is, the outcome difference is divided into three com-
ponents: endowments effects, coefficients effects, and interactions effects. Since in this paper, I
just want to study the effects of the task supply productivity on the wage differences, Equation
(6) could be rewritten as














Where T is a matrix of of task shares (analytical, interactive, manual), η is a matrix of
coefficients on the task shares, and υ contains the terms in the decomposition associated with
variables other than task supplies. Using the same method, I can decompose the native-second
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generation immigrant wage gap as














I use Stata to obtain the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition results (see Jan (2008)).
Table 3 presents results for model (3.5). All the regressions control for both education and
industry fixed effects. From this table, we can see that the three task supplies have similar
effects on earnings for all three types of employees in both census years. Supplying more
analytical and interactive tasks benefits employees’ weekly wages, while manual task supply
hurts them. This finding matches my prediction that analytical and interactive task supply
is rewarded while manual task supply is “punished” in the Canadian labor market. Naturally,
there are some differences in effects of task supply in these two years. In 2015, the increase
in the weekly wage driven by a 1% increase in analytical task supply from all the three types
of employees is larger than it is in 1970. Furthermore, the returns to interactive task supply
are smaller in 2015. Finally, the negative effect of manual task supply on wages become even
larger in 2015, compared to 1970. Similar to what we saw in Table 3, the lack of official
language ability hurts weekly earnings even more in 2015, and the gender wage gap shrinks at
the same time.
As showed by equations (7) & (8), I will use the different returns to tasks, different task
supplies per unit of time, and their interactions to decompose the weekly wage gap between
natives (the third generation or more) and first and second generation immigrants.
Table 4 presents results for the Blinder-Oaxaca decomposition. Panel A gives the amount
of the wage gap explained by differences in task supply, while Panel B shows the amount
of the wage gap explained by the different returns to tasks. First of all, I will focus on
the year 1971. In 1970, on average, both first and second generation immigrants earn a
statistically significantly larger weekly wage than natives (the third generation or more). First
generation immigrants earn 8.9% more per week than natives, while the second generation
earns 10.9% more. Based on the results in Table 3, in 1970, both generations of immigrants
have advantages in the return to analytical and interactive tasks. However, the penalty from
manual task productivity is the largest for secondary generation immigrants and smallest for
first generation immigrants. In Panel B of Table 4, we can see that the higher return to
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interactive task supply generates a (significant) 3.7% widening of the wage gap between first
generation immigrants and natives. The returns to analytical and manual task supply of first
generation immigrants tend to widen the wage gap insignificantly. From Panel A, the amounts
of the wage gap explained by different task supplies are all statistically significant but very
tiny, which is very similar to the results given by the interactions in Panel C.
Turning to the wage gap between natives and second generation immigrants, we can see
that the biggest effect on the wage gap is also from the higher return to interactive task supply
of second generation immigrants, which leads to a 6.2% widening in the gap. The higher return
to second generation immigrants’ analytical task supply leads to a (significant) 1.3% increase
in the wage gap, while the larger penalty from manual task supply significantly reduces the
wage gap by 2%. Meanwhile, similar to the native-first generation immigrant wage gap, the
endowments and interaction effects are both small in comparison to the overall wage difference
between second generation immigrants and natives.
The third and fourth columns of Table 4 present results for 2015. Here, things look a little
different. The mean weekly wage of first generation immigrants is 2.2% lower than natives
(the third generation or more), but the weekly earnings of second generation immigrants
are 9.3% higher than those of natives. Both differences are statistically significant. From
Table 4, in 2015, natives have a significant advantage over first generation immigrants in
the supply of analytical and interactive tasks, controlling for educational attainment and
industry fixed effects. Naturally, if we assume a diminishing marginal return in the production
process, we would predict a significantly lower return to natives’ analytical and interactive task
supply compared with a first generation immigrant with the same demographic characteristics.
In Table 4, we can see that higher the returns to analytical and interactive tasks for first
generation immigrants leads to a significant 3.5% and 4.9% narrowing in the weekly wage gap
with natives. The larger wage penalty from manual task supply widens the wage gap by 0.8%,
which is statistically insignificant.
The effects of the endowments and interactions are relatively small again. Generally, if I do
not control for education and industry fixed effects, first generation immigrants tend to supply
more analytical and interactive tasks than natives, which in fact narrows the weekly wage gap
between natives and first generation immigrants. Therefore, the smaller mean weekly wage
earned by first generation immigrants is driven by other factors such as a discrimination in
the return to immigrants’ educational attainment, compared with a similar native. However,
foreign degrees being less valued is conjecture on my study, and it would be quantified in
future work using the relevant census variable.
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Regarding the wage gap between natives and second generation immigrants in 2015, we
can see that the most significant driver is the difference in the return to manual task supply,
which narrows the gap by 3.3%. Meanwhile, most of the endowments and interactions effects
are very small except the higher analytical task productivity of second generation immigrants
which widens the wage gap by about 2%.
From this exercise, we can learn some things. First of all, immigrants seem to be more
rewarded for “high skill” tasks than natives, and this has a significant effect on their relative
earnings. Moreover, task provision and the return to task provision for both generations
has not changed much from 1970 to 2015, even though their relative earnings have changed
(especially first generation immigrants). So, this change in immigrants’ relative earnings is
not driven by the fact that immigrants are performing systematically different tasks, or being
rewarded differently for tasks.
5.4 Segment Prediction
In this part, I will use ordered probit and ordered logit models to predict the labor market
segments (primary upper tier, primary lower tier, and secondary segment) that first and second
generation immigrants work in, using the third generation as the base group.
Probit and logit coefficients do not have a straightforward intuitive interpretation. So, I
will present average marginal effects. I define
P (segi = n|Z) = P (θn−1 < E
∗
i < θn)
= P (θn−1 < w
′Zi + ε < θn)
= Φ(θn − w
′Zi)− Φ(θn−1 − w
′Zi)
= F (w′Zi)















if xk is continuous. If xk is discrete, the average partial effect is the average of the discrete
differences in the predicted probabilities.
Tables 5 and 6 present the estimated effect of immigrant status on labor market segmen-
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tation. Table 5 applies the ordered probit estimation while Table 6 uses the ordered logit
estimation. All the coefficients in these two tables are statistically significant at the 1% level,
which indicates that the generation dummies do impact which segment an employee should
be in both in the past and present. All the Chi square values of LR (likelihood-ratio) tests
are quite large, which supports the importance of the immigrant generation to segmentation
in the Canadian labor market as well. Generally, we can see that, whether or not we control
or education in the regressions, first generation immigrants tend to work in lower segments
while second generation immigrants tend to work in the higher ones, compared to natives (the
third and more generation immigrants). However, these two tables only give us a sense of the
sign of the effect of immigrant status on segmentation. To understand the magnitude of the
impact, I will derive average marginal effects.
5.4.1 Average Marginal Effects on Immigrants’ Segmentation
Tables 7 & 8 present average marginal effects (AME) of immigrant status on segmentation
based on the ordered probit and logit estimates presented above.
Table 7 presents results based on ordered probit estimates. Taking a look at the results for
the year 1971, with natives as the baseline, we can see that controlling for education does not
impact the AME of being a first generation immigrant very much, while the impact of being
a second generation immigrant appears to be more significant. After I control for education
in the probit model, the effects of being a second generation immigrant tend to be smaller.
Based on these results, being a first generation immigrant leads to a 2% reduction in the
probability of working in the upper tier segment, a 0.9% increase in the likelihood of working
in the lower tier, and a 1.2% increase in the probability of being a secondary-segment worker.
Before controlling for education in the probit model, second generation immigrants tend to
be 1.7% more likely to be in the upper tier, 0.7% less likely to be in the lower tier, and 1%
less likely to be in the secondary segment, compared with the third and higher generation
immigrants. When I control for workers’ education, all these segmentation differences become
quite a bit smaller, but the signs remain the same.
In the results for the year 2016, the education control has a larger effect on the first
generation immigrants’ segmentation tendency. After I control for educational attainment,
the relative tendency of a first generation immigrant to be in the upper tier is decreased from
-1.4% to -4.3%, while the relative tendency to be in the lower tier and secondary segment
is increased from 0.6% and 0.8% to 1.8% and 2.5%, respectively. Similar to 1971, before
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controlling for education in the probit model, second generation immigrants tend to be 2.4%
more likely to be in the upper tier, 1% less likely to be in the lower tier, and 1.4% less likely to
be in the secondary segment, compared with third and higher generation immigrants. After I
control for workers’ education, all these segmentation differences shrink in magnitude, but the
signs stay the same. These findings are consistent with those in the wage difference study that
both of the two generations of immigrants benefit from their higher educational attainments
when compared to the third generation. Table 8 gives a similar estimation as Table 7 with
ordered logit models instead of ordered probit models. All the values in this table are quite
close to Table 7, which support the comments I gave in last paragraph.
From the exercise in this subsection, here are some key points I learn. First, segmentation
results look “worse” for first generation immigrants than the wage results did. It looks like
first generation immigrants are “boxed out” of the upper tier – they earn more than natives
in 1970, but are still less likely to work in the upper tier, which is interesting. Moreover, first
generation immigrants do a lot worse conditional on years of education in 2015 than 1970.
They are much less likely to work in the upper tier conditional on educational attainment.
This is consistent with the discrimination against those with a foreign educational background
story that mentioned in this study.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I examined how first and second generation immigrants behave differently from
natives, which is shorthand for third generation immigrants or higher, in many aspects of the
Canadian labor market. I use data from two census years, 1971 and 2016, because 1970 is
considered to be start of the fifth immigration wave in Canada, and 2016 is the most recent
Canadian census year. Using these data, I explore differences in earnings, task supply, and
segmentation between the two generations of immigrants and natives.
I find that first generation immigrants perform differently from natives in terms of weekly
earnings and task supplies. First of all, there has been a decline in the performance of first
generation immigrants over time, especially conditional on educational attainment. This is
apparent in both earnings and labor market segments. Secondly, second generation immigrants
have not changed quite much (in terms of relative performance) from 1970 to 2015. They seem
to do better than natives because they are more educated on average. Lastly, the change in
immigrants’ fortunes cannot be explained by the fact that the tasks they perform in the labor
market have changed, or that they are rewarded differently for performing certain tasks.
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